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SUMMARY   
Web vulnerability scanners (WVSs) are tools that can detect security vulnerabili-
ties in web services. Although both commercial and open-source WVSs exist, their 
vulnerability detection capability and performance vary. In this paper, we report on 
a comparative study to determine the vulnerability detection capabilities of eight 
WVSs (both open and commercial) using two vulnerable web applications: 
WebGoat and Damn vulnerable web application (DVWA). The eight WVSs stud-
ied were: Acunetix; HP WebInspect; IBM AppScan; OWASP ZAP; SNLS¿VK; 
Arachni; Vega; and Iron WASP. The performance was evaluated using multiple 
evaluation metrics: precision; recall; Youden index; OWASP web benchmark 
evaluation (WBE); and the web application security scanner evaluation criteria 
(WASSEC). The experimental results show that, while the commercial scanners 
are effective in detecting security vulnerabilities, some open-source scanners (such 
as ZAP and Skipfish) can also be effective. In summary, this study recommends 
improving the vulnerability detection capabilities of both the open-source and 
commercial scanners to enhance code coverage and the detection rate, and to re-
duce the number of false-positives. 
 
KEYWORDS  
commercial scanners, open-source scanners, software vulnerability, vulnerable web application, detection 
capability.  
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The economic importance of web applications in multiple domains, including banking [1], transportation 
[2], manufacturing [3], business [4], and education [5], has increased the need for a mechanism to con-
trol and improve their quality. The extensive, almost ubiquitous, use of web applications has also result-
ed in an equally dramatic increase in attacks [6]. These attacks normally target weaknesses, flaws, and 
errors, (commonly referred to as security vulnerabilities) that may cause an explicit failure to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the application [7]. Examples of attacks include: command 
injection [8]; buffer overflow [9],[10]; data or path manipulation [11]; access control [12]; session hi-
jacking [13]; and cookie poisoning [6],[14]. When the attacks succeed, they can result in data breaches 
and have other serious security implications. 
In an attempt to improve both vulnerability detection and the general quality of web applications, 
several web vulnerability scanners (WVSs) have been developed and studied, including: the web appli-
cation attack and audit framework (W3af) [15]; OWASP zed attack proxy (OWASP ZAP) [16]; SNLS¿VK 
[17]; Arachni [18]; Vega, [19]; Stalker [20]; and IronWASP [21]. Seng et al. [22] defined WVSs as tools 
used to test and detect common security breaches in web applications. The National Institute of Stand-
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ards and Technology (NIST) reported varied vulnerability detection capability among the WVSs [23], 
findings supported by later studies [24],[25],[26]. A key question regarding both commercial and open-
source WVSs is: Which MVS is most suited for detecting a particular class of security vulnerability, do-
ing so with high detection and low false-positive rates? Previous studies have attempted to answer this, 
with Fonseca et al. [20] and Suto [27], for example, performing comparative studies of various open-
source and commercial WVSs. Antunes and Vieira [28] investigated the vulnerability detection capabili-
ties of three WVSs (IPT-WS, SIGN-WS and RAD-WS), assessing their effectiveness based on  coverage 
and false-positives, and finding that they could effectively detect the topmost web vulnerabilities, such 
as SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS). Makino and Kleve [25] examined the vulnerability de-
tection capability of two open-source scanners, OWASP ZAP and Skipfish, using the damn vulnerable 
web application (DVWA) and web application vulnerability scanner project [29],[30]: Their experi-
mental results showed ZAP to be superior to Skipfish. 
Although there are several comparative studies on WVSs, the focus has mainly been on commercial 
scanners, with few studies empirically examining the effectiveness of open-source tools. To address this, 
following a similar procedure to that of Makino and Kleve [25], this study examines the vulnerability 
detection capabilities of both the commercial scanners Acunetix [22], HP Webinspect [19], IBM 
Appscan [31], and the open-source scanners OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (OWASP ZAP) [16], SNLS¿VK 
[32], Arachni, Vega [33] and Iron WASP [34]. This choice of WVSs was partly motivated by software 
vendor interest in these specific tools (including reported skepticism over their detection capabilities, in 
terms of their false positive, false negative and coverage [35]), but also due to their apparent wide usage 
and regular updates  [36]. In addition, vendors need to be well-informed of the effectiveness of the tools 
(both open-source and commercial) to enable appropriate evaluation and informed choices. This com-
parative study of the detection capabilities of the tools (both open-source and commercial) will support 
veQdRUV¶ VeOecWion of the most appropriate WVS. 
To the best of our knowledge, no other study has empirically analyzed these scanners against the 
DVWA [37] and WebGoat tools [38], using our selected evaluation metrics (precision; recall; Youden 
index; OWASP web benchmark evaluation (WBE); and the web application security scanner evaluation 
criteria (WASSEC)) [39],[40]. This study makes the following contributions:  
x An extensive experiment evaluating the vulnerability detection effectiveness of eight commercial 
and open-source WVSs is reported on. 
x The functionality of the commercial and open-source WVSs is studied and compared. 
x A number of possible measures to improve the commercial and open-source WVSs are suggested. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the background of the study and 
some previous related research. The methodology and experimental setup are given in Section 3. The 
experimental results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents a detailed discussion of the results. 
Section 6 examines the threats to validity of the study, and, finally, the conclusion and recommendations 
are presented in Section 7. 
 
2   BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
This section presents the background to the study and an overview of some related work. It includes a 
description of the evolution of web applications, web vulnerability scanners (WVSs), and the various 
security vulnerabilities in web applications. There is also a summary of recent research into the evalua-
tion of web scanners. 
The web application security consortium (WASC) [41] defines a Zeb aSSOLcaWLRQ aV ³a VRfWZaUe ap-
plication executed by a Zeb VeUYeU, ZKLcK UeVSRQdV WR d\QaPLc Zeb Sage UeTXeVWV RYeU HTTP.´ AccRUd-
ing to Paulson [42], the turning point in web application development was the introduction of Asynchro-
nous JavaScript and XML (AJAX), a technique for creating better, faster, and more interactive web ap-
plications, which helped transition the old concept of static web pages into a method for deploying inter-
active web applications. The common gateway interface (CGI) became the first standard environment 
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used to generate dynamic web pages, with the use of CGI for website processing becoming known as 
web applications [43]. The introduction of CGI led to the appearance of other web application develop-
ment tools such as PHP, Perl, Java Server Pages (JSP), JavaScript, and VBScript [43]. Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of web applications. 
 
 
     
 F I G U R E  1  Web application evolution 
A web application typically includes a client, a web server, an application server (sometimes sever-
al), and a persistent database server, often with a firewall placed between the client and the webserv-
er/application. Figure 2 depicts a simplified web application framework. 
A WVS performs penetration testing by going through its web pages without executing the program. 
Most MVSs have three main components: one for crawling, one for attacking, and one for analysis [44]. 
The crawling component identifies the input and related pages of the web application based on its uni-
form resource locator (URL). The attacking component breaks down information discovered from the 
various webpages for each input vector and vulnerability type, and then sends the content to the web-
server. The analysis component evaluates and interprets the responses from the server to determine if the 
attacks were successful or not. Techniques for testing web applications for vulnerabilities can be catego-
rized as either white or black box testing [45]. White box testing is often used to analyze the applica-
WLRQ¶V VRXrce code (manually or using a code analysis tool); Black box testing, also known as penetration 
testing, executes the application to detect and locate security vulnerabilities [46]. Ashcan [47], Web 
King [48], Web Inspect [49], and Topsider [50] are some of the most widely applied commercial web 
application scanners.  
 
  F I G U R E  2  Simplified view of a web application framework 
 
Since its creation in 1997, the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [51] has published infor-
mation about more than 43,000 software vulnerabilities affecting more than 17,000 software applications 
[52]. Previous studies have successfully used vulnerabilities in this database to validate the vulnerability 
detection capabilities of their models [53], [54], [55]. Our study also used vulnerabilities presented in 
this database, as well as the vulnerabilities in DVWA and WebGoat. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
studied vulnerability types. There has been growing interest in research evaluating WVS. For example, 
Vieira et al. [56] evaluated the flaw detection capability of four commercial WVSs (Webinspect, 
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Appscan, WSDigger, and Wsfuzzer): They conducted an experiment using 300 well-known web appli-
cations, finding that the selected scanners generated false positives between 35% and 40% of the time. 
Parvez et al. [26] later conducted a comparative study of three other WVSs (Acunetix, Appscan, and 
ZAP), with results indicating an improved detection rate. 
Alsaleh et al. [57] examined four open-source scanners, finding similar detection rates for all four. 
More recently, Sagar et al. [7] evaluated the vulnerability detection capability of three other open-source 
WVSs (w3af, Skipfish, and OWASP ZAP) on the damn vulnerable web application (DVWA), conclud-
ing that OWASP ZAP performed better than the other scanning tools. An examination of these related 
studies reveals that most evaluated the effectiveness of commercial scanners or open-source scanners, 
but not both. Most studies focused only on SQL injection and cross-site scripting. Finally, none of the 
studies examined and compared the WVS performance based on both DVWA and OWASP WebGoat, 
using all the metrics used in our study. 
 
T A B L E  1  Web application vulnerability types 
Vulnerability type Abbr. Vulnerability description 
Denial of Service DOS EYeQW RU acWLRQ WKaW UedXceV RU SUeYeQWV WKe fXQcWLRQ Rf a XVeU¶V WaUgeW Ue-
source or application [58]. 
Code Execution CMD 
Exec 
A situation where an attacker capitalizes on the weakness of a web appli-
cation injects and executes a malicious server script on the targeted appli-
cation to gain access to authorized resources [59]. 
Buffer Overflow BO When an attacker exploits a vulnerability to exceed the memory buffer 
size and copy data from the adjacent memory location to make changes to 
the application [60]. 
Authentication 
Flaws 
AF When an attacker gains access to a user's data through an exposed pass-
word [61]. These types of weaknesses can allow an attacker to either cap-
ture or bypass the authentication methods that are used by a web applica-
tion. 
Cross-Site Script-
ing 
XSS WKeQ aQ aWWacNeU gaLQV acceVV WR a XVeU¶V Zeb aSSOLcaWLRQ SULYLOegeV b\ 
LQMecWLQg PaOLcLRXV JaYaScULSW cRde LQWR WKe XVeU¶V Zeb bURZVeU [44]. 
Cross-Site-
Request Forgery  
CSRF WKeQ WKe aWWacNeU VeQdV aQ XQaXWKeQWLcaWed HTTP UeTXeVW WR a XVeU¶V 
bURZVeU LQWeQdLQg WR VeQd LQfRUPaWLRQ (VXcK aV WKe XVeU¶V VeVVLRQ cRRNLe 
and other relevant information) to a web application [62].  
SQL injection 
(blind) 
BSQLi When an attacker has access to security details (error details) which de-
velopers have hidden. The attack uses a sequence of SQL statements to 
snip the hidden details to perform malicious activities [63]. 
File inclusion FI This error is caused when an application builds a path to executable code 
using an attacker-controlled variable in a way that allows the attacker to 
control which file is executed at run time [64]. 
Reflected Cross-
site scripting  
RXSS When an attacker supplies code (using different dynamic programming 
languages such as ActiveX, Flash, JavaScript, or Java) to the web browser 
of a user through viewed pages [65].  
SQL Injection SQL When an attacker inserts unvalidated input into the database of the web 
application to compromise its expected use [66]. 
Access Control 
Flaws 
ACF It is an unintended access decision caused by PLVcRQ¿gXUed UXOeV, SROi-
cies, or algorithms within an access control system [67]. 
 
3   EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Our empirical study first identified the most widely-used and applied open-source and commercial 
WVSs, according to criteria from the Web Application Security Consortium [68]. We scanned the two 
benchmark web applications (WebGoat and DVWA) for vulnerabilities by configuring the browser and 
the selected WVSs for vulnerability detection. The detection results for each scanner were analyzed, and 
the performances were compared using the target metrics (precision, recall, Youden index, WBE and 
WASSEC). 
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3.1    Research questions 
 
Most commercial WVSs have automated crawlers and scanners, simplifying the vulnerability detection 
process. Open-source scanners, in contrast, typically do not have automated crawlers and scanners, and 
require human intervention, including to configure the tool as a proxy server. Because of this, it may be 
expected that commercial scanners would outperform the open-source scanners. Therefore, our first re-
search question addresses the effectiveness of the commercial and open-source WVSs:  
x RQ1 - How do commercial WVSs compare with open-source WVSs, in terms of detection capability, 
for all vulnerability types in web applications?  
Similar to the motivation behind RQ1, it may also seem more likely that open-source WVSs would 
generate more false-positive results than commercial WVSs. Automated crawlers in commercial WVSs 
can more efficiently crawl all parts of a web application than the manual crawling of open-source WVSs. 
This leads to the second research question:  
x RQ2 - How well do commercial WVSs compare with open-source WVS in terms of the number of 
false-positives generated?  
Penetration testing is an important issue in cybersecurity, which partly explains the large number of 
WVSs developed. Typical questions asked by stakeholders lead to the third research question(s):  
x RQ3 - Which WVS is the most effective for vulnerability detection?  
 
3.2    Experimental setup 
 
The experimental activity was divided into three steps: pre-experimental activities, experimental activi-
ties, and post-experimental activities. In the first stage, we conducted a detailed analysis of the eight 
WVSs to generate the workload (i.e., an idea of the actual work going to be performed). This was fol-
lowed by the selection and detection of vulnerabilities in the respective vulnerable web applications. 
The last stage involved the analysis and performance evaluation of the WVSs against the target met-
rics. The experiment was conducted on a workstation with an Intel(R) Core (TM) i5-6500 CPU at 
3.20GHz, 4 GB of RAM, running Windows 7 Ultimate. 
 
3.3    Vulnerable web applications 
 
To test our approach, we used two vulnerable web application programs: DVWA and WebGoat. Both 
DVWA and WebGoat consist of the OWASP TOP 10 security vulnerabilities. DVWA has a friendly 
user interface that allows developers, teachers, and students to explore and analyze web service security. 
It consists of multiple vulnerabilities, including command execution; cross-site request forgery; insecure 
captcha; file inclusion; SQL injection (standard and blind); reflected cross-site scripting (RXSS); and 
stored cross-site scripting (XSS) [25]. WebGoat is an open-source OWASP application created to help 
developers and experts examine the detection capability of WVS tools. The vulnerability types in 
WebGoat include: access control flaws; ajax security issues; authentication flaws; buffer overflows; 
poor code quality problems; concurrency cross-site scripting; bypass error handling flaws; injection 
flaws; denial of service; insecure communication; insecure configuration; insecure storage; malicious 
execution; parameter tampering; and session management flaws [69]. These vulnerabilities which we 
intend to detect in DVWA and WebGoat are intentionally injected based on the OWASP TOP 10 vul-
nerability in our study. These main web application vulnerability types in DVWA and WebGoat are 
shown in Table 1.  
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3.4    WVSs under-study 
 
Although there are several distributed network scanners with complex architecture, Makino and Kleve 
[25] reported that WVS architecture generally includes four modules: scan engine; scan database; report 
module; and user interface. The scan engine identifies security vulnerabilities with respect to its installed 
plug-ins and compares the outcome with known vulnerabilities. The scan database stores detailed infor-
mation about various vulnerabilities. The report module presents a scan result with recommended solu-
tions for developers and security administrators. The user interface provides a visual platform that can be 
graphical or command-driven, or both, for users to interact with the WVS. Our study examined eight 
WVSs, both commercial and open-source, all of which have a graphical user interface and run under 
Windows OS: 
x Acunetix [70] WVS is a commercial security web tool that scans web applications to detect ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities. It scans for cross-site scripting, SQL Injections and other types of vul-
nerabilities in web applications. Additionally, the tool uses a multi-threaded fast approach to 
crawl through a series of web pages without breaks and produces various forms of compliance 
and technical reports.  
x WebInspect [71] is an automated commercial web application security testing tool that identifies 
known and unknown vulnerabilities, including parameter injection; cross-site scripting; and di-
rectory traversal in web applications.  
x AppScan [22] is a commercial secure web that finds and resolves known vulnerabilities in web 
applications. 
x ZAP [25] is an open-source WVS with a user-friendly interface used for penetration testing. It 
can be used by people with different software security abilities.  
x SNLS¿VK [72] is an open-source web application security reconnaissance tool. It provides an in-
teractive sitemap for the targeted site by carrying out a recursive crawl and dictionary-based 
probes. The resulting map is then annotated with the output from several active security checks. 
TKe ¿QaO UeSRUW geQeUaWed b\ WKe WRRO is meant to serve as a foundation for professional web ap-
plication security assessments.  
x Arachni [21] is an effective and user-friendly open-source WVS, written in Ruby. It is very fast 
at scanning, and offers different user interfaces. It also provides a customized, command-driven 
input, and its output is in the form of HTML.  
x IronWASP [73] (iron web application advanced security testing platform) is an advanced open-
source web application security testing platform that comes in various external libraries such as 
IronPython, IronRuby, JSON, and .NET.  
x Vega [74] is an automated open-source WVS for detecting SQL and other vulnerability types.  
These scanners were selected for the study based on the comparison criteria proposed by the Web 
Application Security Consortium, Web Application Security Scanner Evaluation [75] and a study con-
ducted by Suteva et al. [34] on the most popular open-source vulnerability scanners.  
 
3.5    Performance metrics 
 
Similar to previous studies [25],[76], we compared the performance of the eight WVSs using five evalu-
ation metrics: precision; recall; Youden index; OWASP web benchmark evaluation (WBE); and the web 
application security scanner evaluation criteria (WASSEC). Table 2 summarizes the notation and abbre-
viations [77]. 
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T A B L E  2  Confusion matrix 
Metrics Description 
True Positive (TP) Correctly detected vulnerability.  
False Positive (FP) Vulnerabilities incorrectly classified as vulnerabilities. 
True Negative (TN) No vulnerabilities present, and the tool confirms by not detecting any. 
False Negative (FN) The tool does not identify a vulnerability that is actually present. 
3.5.1     Precision  
 
OWASP [78] defined precision as the percentage of correctly detected vulnerabilities as a proportion of 
all reported vulnerabilities (including those incorrectly labeled). The formula for this metric is given in 
Eq. 1. High precision values indicate a high detection accuracy of actual vulnerabilities. 
 TPPrecision=
TP+FP
 
(1) 
 
3.5.2    Recall 
 
Recall [79] is the number of correctly detected vulnerabilities represented as a proportion of all the 
known vulnerabilities (including those that should have been detected by the tool but were not). The 
formula for the recall is given in Eq. 2. 
 TPRecall=
TP+FN
 
(2) 
3.5.3     OWASP WBE  
 
The OWASP benchmark project proposed a system for evaluating the effectiveness of static analysis 
tools called the WBE result interpretation guide [78]. The guide is a visual representation of a tRRO¶s 
detection performance based on fall-out (false positive) and recall rates. As shown in Figure 3, the line 
e[WeQdLQg fURP WKe SRLQW (0%, 0%) WR (100%, 100%) LV WKe ³gXeVVLQg OLQe´, ZLWK the bug detection TP 
rate equal to the FP rate: performance on this line indicates the same performance as random selection. 
A SORW Rf a WRRO¶V FP UaWe agaLQVW LWV TP UaWe WKaW LV ORcaWed LQ WKe WRS ULgKW cRUQeU LQdLcaWeV WKaW WKe WRRO 
reported everything as vulnerabilities; location in the bottom left corner means that the tool recorded no 
vulnerabilities. The top left corner is the ideal location, indicating the best detection accuracy. 
 
3.5.4     Youden index 
 
The Youden index [80] was proposed to evaluate the performance of analytical (diagnostic) tests. It out-
puts values in the range [-1, 1], where a value of 1 (perfect detection) indicates detection of all vulnera-
bilities with no false positives; -1 indicates only false positives, and no true positives (no actual vulnera-
bilities detected); and a Youden index of 0 means the tool recorded the same result for a web application 
with vulnerabilities and without vulnerabilities ² an invalid result. Eq. 3 shows the formula for calculat-
ing the Youden index. 
 TP TNJ= + 1
TP+FN TN+FP
  (3) 
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F I G U R E  3  OWASP WBE interpretation  
 
3.5.5     Web application security scanner evaluation criteria (WASSEC) 
 
WASSEC [81] is comprised of six evaluation criteria/metrics that can help developers assess WVS de-
tection capability. Table 3 presents the six WASSEC metrics.  
 
T A B L E  3  WASSEC metrics 
Metric Area of coverage 
Protocol Support Get, post, cookie, header, secret, pname, custom, proxy, gzip, eflate, ssl. 
Session Management Custom cookie, custom, header, logout, detection, exclude, log-out, exclude, 
url, exclude, param. 
Testing Sqli, bsqli, ssjsi, rxss, pxss, dxss, jsonh, lfi, rfi, cmdexec, upload, redirect, crlfi, 
ldapi, xpaphi, mxi, ssi, formati, codei, xmli, eli, buffero, integero, codedisc, 
backupf, padding, authb, prive, xxe, session, fixation, csrf, ados. 
Parsing Xml, xmlatt, xmltag, json, netenc, amf, javaser, netser, wcf, wcf-bin, websock, 
dwr, url file. 
Authentication Basic, digest, ntlm, ntlmv2, kerberos, form, cert, captcha. 
Crawling Manual crawl, html crawler, ajax crawler, flash crawler, applet crawler, silver-
light crawler, wsdl crawler, rest crawler, field autofill, smart autofill, anti csrf 
support, viewstate support. 
4   RESULTS 
 
4.1     Detection rates 
 
FLgXUe 4 SUeVeQWV WKe VcaQQeUV¶ WUXe-positive scores for the seven vulnerabilities in DVWA (BSQLi, 
CMDExec, CSRF, RXSS, SXSS, FI, and SQLi). As can be seen from the figure, while all scanners de-
tected some CMDExec, RXSS, SXSS, and SQLi vulnerabilities, there was considerable variation in per-
formance. For the RXSS vulnerabilities, for example, OWASP ZAP discovered 19; Acunetix and 
WebInspect detected five; Arachni detected four; Vega and AppScan detected three, and Skipfish and 
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IronWasp detected one. (The remaining results can be obtained from Figure 4.) The variation in detec-
tion rates could be attributed to how individual scanners are developed for specific vulnerability classes, 
with licensing also appearing to have an influence: The free edition of Acunetix, for example, was only 
able to detect XSS vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the detection capabilities of the scanners also vary from 
one web application to another. 
 
F I G U R E  4  Vulnerability detection capability (true positive count) in DVWA 
 
Figure 5 shows the true-positive scores for the nine vulnerabilities in WebGoat (DoS, CMDExec, 
BF, XSS, CQ, BP, ACF, AF, and BSQLi,). Apart from IronWasp (which only detected two vulnerabili-
ties), all tools were able to detect multiple vulnerabilities. Although no tool was able to detect all 
WebGoat vulnerabilities, the individual WVS performances are a clear indication that the tools were de-
veloped differently, leading to different strengths and weaknesses. The WebGoat vulnerabilities most 
detected were XSS and SQLi. Overall, the results give an indication of the commonalities and comple-
mentary strengths among the WVSs.  
 
 
F I G U R E  5  Vulnerability detection capability (true positive count) in WebGoat 
 
4.2    Scanning time 
 
We also evaluated the efficiency of the scanners based on the time required to complete the detection of 
vulnerabilities in both DVWA and WebGoat. The processing time for each scanner was calculated in 
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seconds. We recorded the time for each scanner in both DVWA and WebGoat and present the result in 
Table 4. It can be seen from Table 4 that the running time for DVWA ranges from 30 to 360 seconds, 
and WebGoat ranges from 30 to 900 seconds. The performance differences between the scanners could 
be due to the URL injection points, with fewer injection points requiring less time than more points. Fur-
thermore, variations in individual tool detection speed (time) could also be attributed to the internal se-
curity components of the applications. For instance, ZAP took 360 seconds in DVWA, but only 60 sec-
onds in WebGoat. The scan profile of the tools for vulnerability detection could impact on the detection 
time. 
 
T A B L E   4  Observed running time of scanners 
Scanners Scan duration 
DVWA WebGoat 
ZAP 360sec 60sec 
Skipfish 120sec 120sec 
Acunetix 122sec 120sec 
Arachni 60sec 900sec 
WebInspect 180sec 181sec 
Vega 60sec 60sec 
AppScan 62sec 70sec 
Iron WASP 60sec 30 sec 
 
4.3    Vulnerability severity  
 
The vulnerabilities detected in DVWA and WebGoat were ranked according to their severity levels [82], 
with high severity meaning the impact of the vulnerability is devastating; medium meaning that the im-
pact is dangerous; low meaning that the impact is minor; and informational severity having a negligible 
impact. 146 vulnerabilities were found in DVWA, of which 28 were of high severity; 29 medium; 50 
low; and 39 informational. Acunetix and AppScan found the highest number of high-severity vulnerabil-
ities in DVWA (10), followed by WebInspect (8). Not all open-source scanners found high-severity vul-
nerabilities, but this could be attributed to the licensing and profile settings of the tools. OWASP ZAP, 
for example, detected 30 vulnerabilities in DVWA (five medium, 20 low, and five informational).  
IronWasp, an open-source web application security tool, detected the least number of vulnerabilities. 
109 vulnerabilities were found in WebGoat, of which 23 were of high severity; 26 medium; 23 low; and 
37 informational. Acunetix, WebInspect, Vega, and AppScan found ten, seven, one, and five high-
severity vulnerabilities, respectively. The different severity ratings of vulnerabilities detected by the 
scanners in DVWA and WebGoat could be ascribed to the internal security architecture of the two web 
applications. The results also indicate that open-source scanners could not detect high-severity web vul-
nerabilities.  
 
5   DISCUSSION 
This section presents a detailed analysis and evaluation of the tools. 
5.1    Precision and recall analysis of scanners 
 
In this study, both precision and recall were measured in the range of 0-100%: An effective tool, with no 
false negatives or false positives, would have a value of 100% for both precision and recall. Figures 6 
and 7 show the SVS precision and recall values for DVWA and WebGoat, respectively.  
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F I G U R E  6  Precision and recall for DVWA 
 
 
 
 
F I G U R E  7  Precision and recall for WebGoat 
 
While the figures show that all scanners achieved a 100% recall score, indicating their ability to de-
tect real vulnerabilities, there is considerable variation in their precision scores. This variation in preci-
sion could be aWWULbXWed WR eacK WRRO¶V XQLTXeQeVV LQ YXOQeUabLOLW\ deWecWLRQ. SNLSfLVK, fRU e[aPSOe, Kad a 
precision score of 75% for both DVWA and WebGoat, but Acunetix scored 68% for DVWA and 64% 
for WebGoat. ZAP, Arachni, and Vega all had precision scores of 56% with DVWA. These scores of 
less than 100% reflect the scanners flagging as vulnerabilities some issues that were not actual vulnera-
bilities (false positives).  
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Answer to RQ1: Detection capability of scanners  
Both the open-source and commercial scanners were effective at detecting vulnerabilities in web 
applications, with the main differences between the two groups being in the different levels of precision 
(false positives). This finding suggests that stakeholders should consider assessing the tools based on the 
lowest numbers of false positives. Some tools were very effective for a specific type of vulnerability: 
While Acunetix, for example, was very effective at detecting reflected cross-site scripting (RXXS) vul-
nerabilities, OWASP ZAP was good at detecting command execution (CMDExec) vulnerabilities. 
5.2    OWASP WBE 
 
The OWASP WBE results interpretation guide (Section 3.5.3) provides a graphical representation of a 
WRRO¶V effecWiveness, mapping its true positive against its false-positive rates, as shown in Figure 3. In our 
experiments, as shown in Eqs. 4 and 5, we defined the total true-positive and total false-positive rates as 
the total number across both DVWA and WebGoat ( and  are the total true and false-positive rates, 
respectively;  and  are the true-positive and false-positive rates, respectively, for DVWA; and  
and   are the true-positive and false-positive rates, respectively, for WebGoat). 
 
t d wTP =TP +TP  (4) 
 
t d wFP =FP +FP  (5) 
   
 
F I G U R E  8  OWASP WBE interpretation guide 
Figure 8 presents the WBE results for the WVSs under study. As explained in Section 3.5.3, the 
VcaQQeU¶V effecWLYeQeVV LV UeSUeVeQWed b\ LWV SRVLWLRQ. AccRUdLQg WR ZAP¶V SRVLWLRQ aW WKe WRS ULgKW cRrner, 
WKe WRRO deWecWV aQd UeSRUWV WKaW ³eYeU\WKLQg LV YXOQeUabOe´ ² both true and false positive rates are high. 
IURQWaVS¶V SRVLWLRQ cRUUeVSRQdV WR WKe ³QRWKLQg LV YXOQeUabOe´ caWegRU\ ² both true and false positive 
rates are low. The performance of IronWasp could be attributed to it having been designed for a specific 
type of vulnerability detection. The remaining scaQQeUV feOO LQWR WKe ³WRRO UeSRUWV QRWKLQg LV YXlQeUabOe´ 
caWegRU\, e[ceSW AUacKQL, ZKLcK ZaV cORVe WR WKe ³WRRO UeSRUWV YXOQeUabLOLW\ UaQdRPO\´ caWegory. 
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Answer to RQ2: False-positive analysis of scanners 
According to the experimental data, there was no single scanner that offered ideal detection for all 
vulnerabilities. There were differences in the false-positive rates of vulnerabilities reported by both 
open-source and commercial scanners, with the rates being relatively higher for open-source tools. This 
performance difference could be attributed to most commercial scanners having automated scanners and 
crawlers, which could be more efficient and effective than the manual configuration and intervention 
necessary for open-source scanners. The generally high false-positive rates reflected an almost random 
vulnerability detection. 
5.3    Youden index 
Figure 9 presents the Youden index (Section 3.5.4) of the scanners under study. IronWASP has the 
highest Youden index (0.83), which indicates its effectiveness detecting known vulnerabilities, with lit-
tle or no false positives. The next highest scoring scanners were Skipfish, Appscan, Webinspect, and 
Acunetix, with 0.45, 0.31, 0.23, and 0.21, respectively. The results also indicate that several open-source 
scanners can function as effectively as some commercial web scanners. Thus, licensing alone should not 
be used as a standard metric for estimating the effectiveness of a tool. 
 
F I G U R E  9  Youden index results 
 
5.4    Web application security scanner evaluation criteria (WASSEC) 
 
Table 5 shows the WASSEC (Section 3.5.5) results for the scanners under test. The results in Table 5 
indicate that Acunetix has the best protocol support, followed by Appscan and Skipfish. The differences 
for session management, however, were much more marginal. Although there are differences in the per-
formance of the scanners, there are similarities in the area of crawling, authentication and testing. Figure 
10 shows the average WASSEC results, according to which Acunetix has the best performance, fol-
lowed by Appscan, with scores of 0.81 and 0.65, respectively. However, the third and fourth-best per-
formers, open-source scanners Skipfish and ZAP ² with scores of 0.43 and 0.40, respectively ² are 
also good performers. 
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T A B L E  5  WASSEC results  
Tools Metrics 
Protocol  
support 
Session  
management 
Testing Parsing Authentication Crawling 
ZAP 7 5 12 2 3 4 
Skipfish 8 5 13 3 3 4 
Acunetix  10 6 28 7 7 9 
Arachni 6 5 12 2 3 3 
WebInspect  7 6 4 0 7 1 
Vega 6 5 10 2 3 3 
AppScan 8 6 22 4 6 8 
IronWASP 6 5 9 3 3 2 
 
 
 
F I G U R E  1 0  Average WASSEC results 
Answer to RQ3: Effectiveness of the scanners for vulnerability detection 
The experimental results show that there is no single WVS that can effectively detect all vulnerabil-
ity classes. Although the results indicate that the commercial scanners Acunetix and Appscan may be the 
most effective, the open-source scanners Skipfish and ZAP also performed well, outperforming other 
commercial WVSs. 
 
6   THREATS TO VALIDITY 
 
A threat to internal validity relates to the number of vulnerabilities used in the experimental analysis, i.e., 
the total vulnerabilities in DVWA and WebGoat. To mitigate this threat, we estimated the total number 
of vulnerabilities by the aggregation of each scanner's true-positive to form a true representation for our 
experiment. There were challenges configuring the tools due to their functionalities not being compati-
ble with the Java platform (new version) employed in this study. We used several versions with limited 
functionality to validate the effectiveness of the tools: This can affect the vulnerability detection rate 
compared to the tools with the full versions. A threat to external validity relates to the generalizability of 
our results because we used vulnerability data from only two vulnerable web applications to verify the 
efficiency of the eight WVSs studied. Our future work will address this threat by examining other vul-
nerabilities and implementation tools. 
 
7   CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
This paper has reported on a comparative study of the vulnerability detection capabilities of eight web 
vulnerability scanners (WVSs) using two vulnerable web applications (Damn vulnerable web 
application (DVWA) and WebGoat). Of the eight WVSs studied, three were commercial scanners 
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(Acunetix, HP Webinspect, and IBM Appscan), and five were open-source scanners (OWASP ZAP, 
SNLS¿VK, AUacKQL, Vega, aQd IURQWASP). TKeLU SeUfRUPaQce ZaV e[aPLQed XVLQg fLYe PeWULcV: 
precision; recall; Youden index; OWASP web benchmark evaluation (WBE); and the web application 
security scanner evaluation criteria (WASSEC). The experimental results show that the commercial 
scanners were effective at detecting security vulnerabilities, but that there were also open-source 
scanners (ZAP and Skipfish) that were equally efficient at detecting some vulnerabilities (including 
command execution, cross-site scripting, and SQL injection). Based on the experimental analysis, we 
recommend improving the vulnerability detection capabilities of the commercial and open-source 
scanners, to enhance code coverage and detection rates, and to reduce false positives. The development 
of WVSs should be standardized, to improve the systems, and promote the production of high-quality 
tools. Reports generated by scanners should not be difficult for users to interpret and understand (such as 
the HTML and XML reports provided by ZAP). In our future work, we will extend this study to include 
more state-of-the-art tools, and to examine performance with different vulnerable web applications. 
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